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A Preemptive Copyright Ghost Lurking in
Breach of Contract Claims: Resolving the
Copyright Preemption Analysis
Jessica Nguyen
INTRODUCTION
Supernatural activity has overtaken copyright law, reigniting the
pressure to resolve significant legal issues after a period of quiet unrest.1
Ghost Hunters, a Syfy channel reality show following investigators as they
study paranormal activity, has provided more than intrigue to viewers every
Wednesday night; it has intensified an ongoing debate among the thirteen
judicial circuits.2 While a paranormal team investigates the ghost of a
colonel lurking in a Kentucky distillery on next week’s Ghost Hunters
episode,3 parapsychologist Larry Montz continues to wage his legal battle
against NBC Universal (NBC) and Pilgrim Films & Television.4 Montz

J.D. Candidate 2013, Chapman University School of Law. B.S. 2009 New York University. I
would like to acknowledge Professor Judd Funk and Professor John Tehranian for their guidance,
advice, and highly entertaining stories that heavily shaped this Comment and my perspective on a
career in the entertainment industry. I am tremendously thankful to my family and friends. Their
unconditional love and support have pushed me to work hard and strive for the best in everything I do.
And finally, I am especially grateful to Ryan Maughan for his understanding and encouragement during
the writing of this Comment.
1 Anna Buono, Ninth Circuit Revives California Idea Submission Claims, MEDIA LAW MONITOR
(June 13, 2011), http://www.medialawmonitor.com/2011/06/ninth-circuit-revives-california-ideasubmission-claims (noting that the decision of the en banc panel in Montz v. Pilgrim Films &
Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011), revived state law claims that had been regarded as
preempted by copyright law).
2 See Montz, 649 F.3d at 977–78.
3 Ghost Hunters, Episode: “Distillery of Spirits,” TV GUIDE, http://www.tvguide.com/
tvshows/ghost-hunters-2011/episode-23-season-7/distillery-of-spirits/191528 (last visited Nov. 5,
2011).
4 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, No. 11–143,
2011 WL 3380764, at *2 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011) (requesting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and to
rule on an issue of law that will provide guidance to lower courts because this type of conflict
continually arises); Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, 132 S. Ct. 550, 550 (2011) (denying
certiorari to hear the Montz case). The acceptance or denial of certiorari is a strategic move by the
Supreme Court. See RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BRETT W. CURRY & BRYAN W. MARSHALL, DECISION
MAKING BY THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 40–41 (2011)
A justice who may wish to reverse a lower court decision nevertheless votes to deny
certiorari because she realizes that her preferred case outcome is unlikely to prevail at the
merits stage. . . . [H]er strategic action of defensively denying cert may have prevented an
affirmance that would have taken on precedential value. . . . Alternatively, a strategic
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claims that he first pitched the idea of a show following paranormal
investigators to NBC and the Syfy channel.5 But both declined to use the
idea.6 NBC then produced Ghost Hunters for the Syfy channel, which
resulted in Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc.7 Montz wound its way
up to the Supreme Court where the entertainment industry rushed to have
its say.8 The immediate issue in the Montz case was whether federal
copyright law preempted Montz’s state claims for breach of implied
contract and breach of confidence.9 The test that many courts employ to
resolve whether state claims are worthy of surviving preemption has left
plaintiffs, defendants, writers, and the media industry with little guidance.
This Comment proposes a new test with a clear set of factors to determine
what it takes for a state law claim to avoid preemption.
Part I will explain the dynamics of the entertainment industry, the
formation of implied contracts in the entertainment industry, and the
industry’s business structure, which favors media companies and
established producers. Part II will discuss the basic foundation of federal
copyright law, the necessity of preemption to maintain copyright law, and
the role of the “extra element” test in parsing out preempted claims. Part III
will examine how the “extra element” test has been applied in different
ways among the courts. Finally, Part IV will propose a new test with a
distinct set of factors that should be used in lieu of the “extra element” test.
I. CONTRACTING FOR IDEAS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
The entertainment industry regularly strikes deals, allowing innovators
to create the products consumers enjoy most: movies, television shows,
music, and video games.10 The transactions are fluid and efficient because

justice may vote to hear a case—or pursue an ‘aggressive grant’ of certiorari—when he
thinks his preferred policy outcome will be reflected in the Court’s ultimate decision on the
merits.
Id.; see also Eriq Gardner, Supreme Court Deals Setback to Hollywood, Won’t Hear Key ‘Ghost
Hunters’
Case,
THE
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER
(Nov.
7,
2011,
1:59
PM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/ghost-hunters-trial-syfy-nbc-universal-258280 (noting that
the denial of certiorari of the Montz case leaves studios open to more lawsuits).
5 Montz, 649 F.3d at 978.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Press Release, Kelley Drye Files Amicus Brief for U.S. Supreme Court Review of Montz
Case
(Sept.
16,
2011),
available
at
http://www.kelleydrye.com/news/press_releases/
2254 (announcing that a Los Angeles law firm filed an amicus brief on behalf of the defendants, asking
the Supreme Court to review the Montz case because the law firm constantly faced litigation in the areas
of copyright and idea submission claims).
Many parties are affected by a decision such as this and if the Supreme Court had granted review, its
finding would have had broad implications. See Decision Against NBC Universal for Use of Pitched
Television Show Concept Without Compensation/Credit Being Appealed to Supreme Court, ARENT
FOX,
(Oct.
10,
2011),
http://www.arentfox.com/
publications/index.cfm?fa=legalUpdateDisp&content_id=3353 (“Multiple parties are seeking leave to
file amicus briefs in the matter.”).
9 Montz, 649 F.3d at 977–79.
10 See MARK LITWAK, DEALMAKING IN THE FILM & TELEVISION INDUSTRY 11 (2d. ed. 2002)
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the entertainment industry is built on relationships, custom, and courses of
dealing through the repeated interactions of writers, producers, actors,
directors, and studios.11 For example, studios will typically only accept
ideas for new films, television shows, or books from writers who use an
agent.12 The agent acts as a gateway, regulating the relationship between
idea creators and the studio.13 Any unsolicited ideas submitted without
representation by an agent are returned to the writer.14 An agent has an
established reputation in the entertainment industry allowing him to
negotiate on behalf of a writer to get the best deal possible.15 Therefore, a
person’s reputation in the entertainment industry is a crucial component of
maintaining expectations, transacting in business, and making deals.16
A key component to exchanges in the entertainment industry is
acceptance of the implied contract.17 The implied contract recognizes a
(noting that there is more dealmaking than ever before in the movie industry).
There are a wide range of deals available in the entertainment industry such as cash up front (money is
guaranteed), back-end deal (a portion of the cash is taken up front but a share of the product’s profit is
also taken), working for scale (taking a large pay cut and accepting only the mandated minimum
amount of money proscribed by organizations like guilds and unions), and tit for tat (trading something
for another). See Daniel Fierman, Terms of En-deal-ment, ENTERTAINMENTWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 3,
2000),
http://www.ew.com/
ew/article/0,,275563,00.html.
11 See Kirk T. Schroder, Entertainment Law: Some Practice Considerations For Beginners, 13
ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 8, 10 (1996) (“[T]he entertainment industry thrives on relationships.”); STEPHEN
F. BREIMER, ESQ., THE SCREENWRITER’S LEGAL GUIDE 172–73 (2d ed. 1999) (establishing that
“relationship protection” exists in the entertainment industry: “Agents would not submit material or set
up meetings if there was a substantial risk that their clients might be ripped off as a result of such pitch
meetings”).
A course of dealing refers to the conduct before the agreement in question. JOHN D. CALAMARI &
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 161 (4th ed. 1998). It is the series of previous conduct
between two parties to a particular transaction that “establish[es] a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.” Id. (quoting UCC § 1–205(1)). See also LITWAK,
supra note 10, at 251 (“[A]gents, attorneys, studio executives and producers regularly conduct business
with one another and observe an unwritten code of behavior.”).
12 See Neta-Li E. Gottlieb, Free To Air?—Legal Protection For TV Program Formats, 51 IDEA:
THE INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 230 (2011) (observing that the relationship between agent and the
studio/producer is mutual because the producers rely on the agents to get new ideas).
13 See LITWAK, supra note 10, at 353 (describing how agents will not push too hard on some deal
terms because they will have to negotiate with that same person again in the future); MIKE MEDAVOY
ET AL., THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 100 (Jason E. Squire ed., 2d ed. 1992) (“The agent can help to
keep lines of communication open between writer and buyer and to work out problems that might arise
from misunderstandings or differences of opinion.”).
14 See Jonathan H. Anschell, Jennifer B. Hodulik & Allison S. Rohrer, The Whole Enchilada:
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp. and Idea Submission Claims, 21 COMM. LAW., no. 4, 2008, at 1, 27
(indicating that a defendant is in a good position to challenge a state law idea submission claim if the
plaintiff’s submission was unsolicited).
15 See LITWAK, supra note 10, at 353 (describing how agents can negotiate routine deals for
clients without the help of a lawyer).
16 See Gottlieb, supra note 12, at 230 (noting that an “agent’s livelihood is based on her
reputation”); PHILIP H. MILLER, MEDIA LAW FOR PRODUCERS 29 (4th ed. 2003) (“Like any business,
the business of media production involves managing many working relationships.”). The success of a
project depends on how the relationships are managed. Id. Entertainment industry professionals take
pride in keeping their word. LITWAK, supra note 10, at 251.
17 See Anna R. Buono & Alonzo Wickers IV, Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc.:
Copyright Preemption and Idea Submission Cases, 28 COMM. LAW, no. 2, 2011 at 4, (recognizing that
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mutual agreement between a producer and writer:18 if the producer uses the
writer’s idea, then the writer will be compensated.19 This agreement may
not be captured in written form, but is merely understood by all the parties
involved. The implied contract is a useful tool to get around a written
agreement.20 No express written agreement is necessary, or even preferred,
given that the fast-paced nature of the entertainment business calls for
efficiency and speed.21 The process of negotiating and drafting long-form
contracts for every deal impedes the flow of business.22 Similarly, if the
implied contract is breached, most cases settle to ensure business
California law accepts the custom where a producer and author approach a pitch meeting with the
“mutual understanding that the author will be compensated and credited if the producer uses her
ideas”); see also Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting)
(noting that it is not unreasonable to imply “that one would obligate himself to pay for an idea that
would otherwise be free to use”).
There are two types of implied contracts in contract law: the implied-in-fact contract and the implied-inlaw contract. The words or conduct demonstrating the agreement of the parties to a contract give rise to
an implied-in-fact contract. See 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 35 (4th ed. 2007). An
implied-in-law contract, on the other hand, does not require a meeting of the minds but is a concept
imposed by the fiction of law for reasons of justice. See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446,
456 (6th Cir. 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981); see also Caroline Cnty. v.
Dashiell, 747 A.2d 600, 606 (Md. 2000) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (6th ed. 1990))
(defining an implied-in-law contract as one where circumstances justify implying a contract where none
existed, especially in cases where parties place others in the wrong and equity commands that the
situation should not have taken place).
18 See Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 5168(CM), 2011
WL 1792587, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011) (alleging that the defendants knew at all times that ideas
are pitched to studios in order to sell those ideas in return for payment and that it is a standard in the
entertainment industry that ideas are pitched with “the expectation of compensation in the event of
use”); Thompson v. Cal. Brewing Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 783, 786 (Cal. Dist. App. 1961) (holding that it is
possible for a payment agreement to be implied from the circumstances); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d
257, 270 (Cal. 1956) (stating that the circumstances are known to the idea receiver before the idea is
conveyed and the receiver accepts the idea disclosure with the conditions that accompany it, i.e.
payment); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (describing the writer’s assent as
submitting his idea to the producer and the producer’s assent as his acceptance of the materials).
19 Desny, 299 P.2d at 269 (clarifying that where a producer is the beneficiary of an author’s idea
and the producer profits from that idea, there is no reason why the producer should not be able to agree
to pay for that idea).
Ideas conveyed to a producer or studio can be bargained for and constitute “valuable consideration”
because the producer holds it as his own and may use it as he sees fit after the acquisition. Id.; see also
High v. Trade Union Courier Publ’g Corp., 31 Misc. 2d 7, 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (noting that even if an
idea is common knowledge, it can constitute consideration in a promise to pay if the disclosure of the
idea is protected by contract).
20 See Michael S. Bogner, Comment, The Problem with Handshakes: An Evaluation of Oral
Agreements in the United States Film Industry, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 359, 359 (2004) (stating that
the film business is a “handshake business” and relationships in the film industry are based on the
handshake); see also BROOKE A. WHARTON, THE WRITER GOT SCREWED (BUT DIDN’T HAVE TO) 53
(1997) (stating that while most contracts are not enforceable unless they are signed, the entertainment
industry has nothing to do with those types of contracts).
21 See Bogner, supra note 20, at 377 (reasoning that the speed of deals requires an agreement
between parties even before lawyers can negotiate and execute a written contract); see also IATSE LOC.
336, http://www.iatse-336.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
22 See Bogner, supra note 20, at 375 (finding that complex deal points are negotiated for long
periods of time until they are reduced into a long-form contract and that lawyers may stunt quick deal
resolutions because they demand more detail); see also WHARTON, supra note 20, at 52 (noting that
most contracts do not have to be in writing to be enforceable). The contracts in the entertainment
industry that must be in writing are work-for-hire contracts, assignments, and licenses. Id. at 54.
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consistency.23 Therefore, the implied contract is important to the proper
functioning and maintenance of the entertainment industry.
While it would be ideal for writers and studios to hold an equal share
of the power in an entertainment industry business relationship, this is
simply not the case.24 The lion’s share of power is in the hands of
producers and well-established media companies.25 This imbalance is due
to several circumstances: (1) the disproportionate number of writers to
producers/studios;26 (2) the use of releases by studios and producers to limit
the amount of ideas they receive;27 and (3) the “independent creation”
defense available to producers when they are sued.28
First, the number of people clamoring to get into the entertainment
industry is staggering.29 Studios have their pick of ideas and personnel. The
nature of supply and demand weighs heavily against the writers.
Second, producers and studios are at liberty to demand that a writer
sign a release before submitting an idea, which waives a writer’s rights to
his material.30 A producer or studio manages the number of submissions
they receive by refusing to accept unsolicited ideas unless a release has
been signed.31 But a writer who submits his ideas through an agent usually
does not have to sign a release.32 Therefore, writers without an agent are in
the feeble position of either waiving their rights or not having their ideas
23 Brian Devine, Free as the Air: Rethinking the Law of Story Ideas, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 355, 380 (2001). Lawsuits cost a lot of money and the amount of money at stake may not justify
expending legal fees to proceed to litigation. LITWAK, supra note 10, at 342–43.
24 See Camilla M. Jackson, “I’ve Got This Great Idea for a Movie!” A Comparison of the Laws
in California and New York That Protect Idea Submissions, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47, 58
(1996) (“No one in Hollywood has as little power as the aspiring writer . . . and television and film
studios have absolutely no incentive—legal or otherwise—to bargain fairly.”).
25 See Jonathan D. Cohen, Note, Remedies for Misappropriation of Motion Picture and
Television Story Ideas, 7 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85, 102 (1984) (“A free-lance writer dealing
with a major independent producer does not do so on an equal footing.”).
26 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 58 (“Due to the small number of major television and movie
studios, there is a limited number of people to whom the creator of an idea can submit his or her work.
But the number of writers and other creative people who wish to sell ideas is virtually unlimited.”); see
also BREIMER, supra note 11, at 8 (observing that there is a lot of competition in submitting ideas to
movie studios).
27 Devine, supra note 23, at 385–86.
28 See Allison S. Brehm, Creative Defense, 33 L.A. LAW 28, 30 (2010) (noting how the
“independent creation” defense plays a great role in defeating idea submission claims).
29 See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317,
328 (2010) (“[T]here is no shortage of new entertainment ideas or creators striving to break into the
entertainment industry.”).
30 See Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass
Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735, 764 (1966) (clarifying that a “release form” is a
contract of adhesion that waives all right to sue).
31 See Devine, supra note 23, at 364–65 (discussing how the release is used as a tactic to protect
producers/studios from liability in a lawsuit).
32 See WHARTON, supra note 20, at 25–26 (“In order to prevent the possibility of a lawsuit, most
people in the entertainment business have decided to accept unsolicited work only from agents or
lawyers, or after receiving a signed release form from the writer.”). An agent is an individual licensed to
obtain work for individuals in the entertainment industry. Id. at 75. Agents play an important role as
intermediaries for the writer and producer. Devine, supra note 23, at 365.
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heard at all.33 Producers and studios can make their demands, knowing that
they possess greater bargaining power than their writer counterparts.34
Producers and studios are also better positioned to advantageously alter
industry customs because they perpetually hold the upper hand.35 Writers
are therefore left at the whim of the top “players” in the entertainment
business.36
Lastly, an independent creation defense arms studios and producers
with a tool to rebut a writer’s breach of implied contract claim.37 The
independent creation defense rebuts the plaintiff’s claim if a defendant can
show he thought of the idea on his own.38 Even if the defendant produced
the disputed work after he had access to the plaintiff’s idea, the defendant
can still use the defense to defeat an idea submission claim.39 Once again,
the studio and the producer win.
A writer that voluntarily chooses to venture into the entertainment
business faces an ongoing struggle.40 He is forced to adhere to rules
dictated by the opposing side.41 But in abiding by those rules, one of the
strongest forms of protection that a writer can have over his work is a
copyright.

33 Devine, supra note 23, at 386. See also WHARTON, supra note 20, at 29 (noting that signing a
release will put writers in the position of feeling as if they are giving their work away).
34 Devine, supra note 23, at 386.
35 Id. at 385 (observing that producers can adjust their behavior in response to legal rules that
could potentially affect their liability).
36 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 102 (noting that the relationship between a writer and producer is
unbalanced); MARK LITWAK, CONTRACTS FOR THE FILM & TELEVISION INDUSTRY 5 (1998)
(mentioning that it is difficult for writers to get in the door to see producers); LITWAK, supra note 10, at
251 (referring to the top Hollywood dealmakers as “players”).
37 Allison S. Brehm, What’s the Use? A Primer on the Defense of Independent Creation to
Combat Allegations of Idea Theft, 1 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 94, 96–97 (2011). To prevail on a
breach of implied contract claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he prepared the work; (2) he disclosed the
work to the defendant; (3) the defendant voluntarily accepted the disclosure with knowledge of the
circumstances; (4) the reasonable value of the work; and (5) the defendant used the plaintiff’s work.
Star Patrol Enters., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 129 F.3d 127, at *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Klekas v. EMI
Films, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 296, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). See also Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,
180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (including an additional element that the defendant used
the plaintiff’s idea, meaning that the defendant substantially based his work on the plaintiff’s ideas).
38 Brehm, supra note 37, at 96–97.
39 See id. at 110 (explaining that defendants can still use the independent creation defense even
after the defendant has heard the plaintiff’s idea by showing that the defendant created the work without
access to the plaintiff’s idea through producing declarations or showing the work was made from other
sources).
40 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 102 (observing that where a producer and writer contract with
each other, an enormous amount of power lays in the hands of the producer). “It is difficult to imagine
any producer agreeing to terms that are substantially favorable to the writer, as the producer has access
to a veritable sea of ideas, generated both by other outside free-lance hopefuls and by inside production
personnel.” Id.
41 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 102.
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II. THE BASICS OF COPYRIGHT, PREEMPTION, AND THE EXTRA ELEMENT
TEST
A copyright protects the labor and investment a person has put into a
particular piece of work42 by granting the author “a series of exclusive
rights.”43 To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright44 and (2) the infringing party
copied original elements of the copyrighted work.45 The second
requirement will be more challenging for the plaintiff to prove than the
first. Without direct evidence of copying,46 the plaintiff has a heavy
burden47 to show that his work and the infringing work are “substantially
similar” in both idea and expression.48 The test of substantial similarity is

42 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006). See Fogerty v. Fantasy,
Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–
50 (1991)) (clarifying that copyright does not act as an award for the author’s labor, but assures his
“right to original expression”).
43 Buono & Wickers IV, supra note 17, at 5. Section 102 of the Copyright Act grants protection
to works that are fixed in any tangible medium of expression including (1) literary works, (2) musical
works, (3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes and choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings, and (8)
architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
Section 106 grants the exclusive right (1) to reproduction of the work, (2) to preparation of derivative
works based on the copyrighted work, (3) to distribution of the work to the public, (4) to performance
of the work publicly, and (5) to display of the work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to grant rights to authors for the work in
furtherance of the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44 To register a copyright, one must file an application with the Copyright Office, pay the fee, and
deposit the required number of copies or phonorecords. ROBERT B. CHICKERING & SUSAN HARTMAN,
HOW TO REGISTER A COPYRIGHT AND PROTECT YOUR CREATIVE WORK 13 (1980). The copyright
registration becomes effective on the day when the Copyright Office receives all the materials. Id.
45 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The real task in a
copyright infringement action, then, is to determine whether there has been copying . . . .”), superseded
on other grounds by 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), as recognized in Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561
F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2009).
46 See Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976) (observing how
difficult it may be to obtain direct evidence of copying).
47 See Muller v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 429, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(deciding for summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the similarities were insubstantial);
Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding dissimilarity because even
though there were some similarities, they were “too general or too insignificant to be protectable”);
Buono & Wickers IV, supra note 17, at n.15 (admitting that the court usually finds for the copyright
defendant on summary judgment) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990))).
48 Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985); Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner
Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562
F.2d at 1164 (stating that there must be “substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the
expressions of those ideas as well.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b); see
also Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92–93 (“Since both [works] present only the same idea, no infringement as to
protected expression occurred.”); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“[S]imilarity of idea or function must be distinguished from similarity of artistic expression.”); FisherPrice, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between the
plaintiff’s demonstration of “similarity,” which applies to the entire work, including idea and
expression, not just the protectable elements, and the plaintiff’s demonstration of “illegality,” meaning
that the plaintiff proves the defendant took the plaintiff’s means of idea expression, not merely that the
defendant expressed the same idea); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995)
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“whether the accused work is so similar to the copyrighted work that the
ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully”
used the plaintiff’s work.49 Even if the similarity is a small part of the entire
work, substantial similarity can be found if the similarity is “qualitatively”
important.50
The courts have applied different tests to guide them in determining
the adequate level of similarity between two works necessary to meet the
substantial similarity test.51 For example, the Ninth Circuit test employs a

(discussing the analysis of a work that contains protectable and unprotectable elements requires
isolating the unprotectable elements and asking “whether the protectable elements, standing alone, are
substantially similar”).
The “idea/expression dichotomy” is the distinction between an unprotectable idea and its protectable
expression. Jonathan S. Caplan, Copyright Infringement—Application of the Originality Requirement
and the Idea/Expression Merger Doctrine to Compilations of Data—Kregos v. Associated Press, 937
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991), 65 TEMP. L. REV. 275, 275–76 (1992). It limits copyright protection in the case
of facts, principles, and ideas. 2 JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 5.01[2], at 5–9 (Law Journal Press
2012).
49 See Russel J. Frackman, Litigating Copyright Cases, PLI Order No. G4 –3954, 419 PLI/Pat 7,
27 (1995); see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(explaining that a casual observer would overlook the differences between a plaintiff and defendant’s
work unless he actually intended to find the disparities).
50 See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1985); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that even though only less than one percent of the copyrighted letters
were copied, they were relevant); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
that “[a] snapshot of a single moment . . . may communicate a great deal”). But see Concrete Machinery
Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that copyright
infringement will not be found only when slight or trivial variations are found between the two works).
51 See Frackman, supra note 49, at 28.
A sample of the tests to define “substantial similarity” include:
The “abstractions” test: A defendant may take an abstract of the whole copyrighted work.
Many patterns of generality can fit around a copyrighted work and the number of patterns
increases as specifics are omitted from the abstract until all that may be left is a title or a
summary of the work.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). A point exists where the
copyrighted work is no longer protected because the similarity lies in the idea rather than the expression
of the idea. Id.; see, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
no substantial similarity existed between a film and a book beyond generalized and nonprotectible ideas
because they “differ radically in pace and dramatic structure,” even though they both tell the same
story).
The “patterns” test: The “pattern” of a work is protected. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law
of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 513–14 (1945). “Pattern” includes the “sequence of events and
the development of the interplay of characters.” Id.
“Comprehensive nonliteral similarity” and “fragmented literal similarity”: “Comprehensive nonliteral
similarity” is a situation where the offending work copies the fundamental essence or structure of
another work. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1], at
13-39 (Matthew Bender 2012). See, e.g., Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1173 (D. Colo.
1988) (holding that a videotape and travel guide did not meet the standard because the similarities in
structure and essence are inherent in other travel guides reviewing similar subjects). The “fragmented
literal similarity” test entails a situation where pieces of a copyrightable work are taken and used, but
the fundamental substance of the work is not copied. The test examines when the similarity becomes so
substantial as to constitute infringement. 4 NIMMER, supra note 51, § 13.03[A][2], at 13-54. The
question becomes “whether the similarity relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of
plaintiff’s work—not whether such material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant’s work.” Id. at
13-54.1 (emphasis added).
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two-step process.52 The first step is an “extrinsic test”53 that examines
whether the general ideas are substantially similar, using specific criteria,
such as the type of artwork, the materials, the subject matter, and the
setting of the story.54 Satisfying this objective test55 can be difficult because
the analysis depends on the availability and complexity of the evidence.56 If
the extrinsic test is satisfied and the ideas are substantially similar, the
analysis progresses to the second step, labeled the “intrinsic test.” This
focuses on the expression of the idea, such as the final version of a movie
or the aired version of a television show.57 This test is subjective58 and
relies on the perceptions, observations, and impressions of an ordinary,
reasonable person who can respond to the expression.59 Therefore, the
extrinsic test resolves whether a defendant has taken the actual idea while
The “total concept and feel” test: The degree to which it appears to an observer that the defendant
captured the total concept and feel of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. See Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding that the characters in the art work, the
mood the characters portrayed, the totality of the art work “conveying a particular mood with a
particular message,” and the word arrangement are substantially similar to the copyrighted work),
superseded by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 654 F.2d 204,
211 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[E][3], at 13-48 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 1980)) (finding that the total concept and feel of the two
works are different because the plaintiff attempts to meet his burden of proof in an analysis that changes
the “actual sequence or construction” of his work to achieve greater similarity with the defendant’s
product); Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the
works are not similar in “total feel” because the copyrighted work develops the characters and the
allegedly infringing work is void of setting or character development in presenting the theme).
52 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977) (concluding that the requirement of substantial similarity in a copyright infringement claim
imposes a two-step analytic process), superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(b).
53 It is labeled the extrinsic test because the resolution of the test does not depend on a judge or
jury’s determination but on specific evidence. As such, expert testimony is relevant. Id.
54 Id.; see also Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (adding to the list of
specific expressive elements in a substantial similarity analysis: plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting,
pace, characters, and sequence of events); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that the substantial similarity test compares “actual concrete elements” that are part of the
storyline and the major characters, rather than analyzing the similarities between the basic plot ideas).
55 Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994).
56 See Scott Hervey, The Complexity of Proving Copyright Infringement, WEINTRAUB GENSHLEA
CHEDIAK:
THE
IP
LAW
BLOG,
(Feb.
20,
2007),
http://www.theiplawblog.com/
archives/-copyright-law-the-complexity-of-proving-copyright-infringement.html (opining that the
extrinsic test focuses on “articulable similarities between protectable elements,” rather than the basic
plot ideas).
57 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164 (noting that “[i]f there is
substantial similarity in ideas, then the trier of fact must decide whether there is substantial similarity in
the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute infringement”).
58 See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that “judicial
determination under the intrinsic test is now virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test has
become a mere subjective judgment as to whether two . . . works are or are not similar.”).
59 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944). Since the
test is a subjective one, the intrinsic test is usually left in the hands of a jury to decide. See Shaw, 929
F.2d at 1360 (commenting on how the subjective assessment is better suited for the jury than for a judge
because subjectivity is not a legal conclusion but one that depends on each individual person’s
interaction with the two pieces of work in dispute); Matthew Joseph, The Unsolicited Screenplay
Cometh — Copyright infringement claims by unpublished authors, LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW A.
JOSEPH, Vol. 2004, No. 4, http://www.josephlaw.com/notes/archives/april04.html (noting that the jury
is a “proxy” audience).
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the intrinsic test determines whether the expression of the idea has been
pilfered.60 Satisfying both the extrinsic test and the intrinsic test constitutes
copyright infringement.61
The two-part substantial similarity test demonstrates that copyright
protection does not extend to ideas alone; the idea must be accompanied
with an expression of the idea to be eligible for copyright protection.62 Idea
purveyors,63 such as Larry Montz, who have not yet embodied their ideas in
an expression before the alleged infringement took place must therefore
seek recourse through other legal causes of action.64 Copyright preemption
responds to these alternatives by moderating the relationship between
federal and state law.65 It ensures that protecting ideas through state law
causes of action does not interfere with federal copyright law.66 And where

60 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1165. See Williams v. Crichton, 84
F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that if the similarity lays in noncopyrightable elements then there
is no substantial similarity).
61 See Nicholas R. Monlux, An Invitation for Infringement: How the Ninth Circuit’s Extrinsic and
Intrinsic Similarity Tests Encourage Infringement: An Analysis Using Reece v. Island Treasures Art
Gallery, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 543, 544 (2008) (noting that the test used in analyzing
copyright infringement claims is a two-part test).
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) (clarifying that copyright does not cover “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work”); Blakeman v. The Walt Disney Co.,
613 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 3 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir.
1993) (stating that “[t]he law is clear that ‘a copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression
of an idea . . .’”)); LITWAK, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that “ideas are not copyrightable because they
are not considered ‘an expression of an author’”).
As applied specifically to the Montz case, copyright law does not protect Larry’s Montz’s idea for a
television show. Muller v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 429, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
Even though the author is not afforded copyright protection for his idea, the producer and author can
contract to supply such protection. See Minnear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 503 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1968) (citing Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)) (explaining that even though
the material is unprotected, the producer and writer are free to make whatever contract they want to
transact in the exchange of ideas regardless of whether the producer later finds that he could have
contrived the exact ideas without paying money for them).
63 “Idea men” try to market the products of their minds and have a difficult time doing so because
of their poor bargaining position. Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind:
An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 708 (2006). The term “idea man” is used in
scholarship concerning the protection of ideas. Samuel M. Bayard, Note, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit
Judges, and Movie Scripts, Oh My!: Copyright Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 603, 604 n.5 (2001).
64 See Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting
Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950)) (noting that “[t]he use of ideas
unprotected by copyright may provide the basis for a breach of contract claim because ‘the policy that
precludes protection of an abstract idea by copyright does not prevent its protection by contract’”).
65 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 375 (7th ed. 2004)
(“The Court must consider the federal law and its operation and compare the state statute and its
operation.”). Preemption is based on the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, requiring that
federal law override state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of laws. Id. at
374.
66 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 523 (4th ed. 2005) (recognizing
that the overlap and coexistence between common law copyright and federal copyright laws has created
tension).

Do Not Delete

2013]

4/13/2013 11:21 PM

Copyright Ghost Lurking in Breach of Contract Claims

447

a conflict exists, federal law controls.67 A state law claim is preempted if
two requirements are met: (1) the “subject matter requirement”—the work
to be protected falls within one of the categories protected by the Copyright
Act;68 and (2) the “general scope requirement”—the state law claim asserts
rights (i.e., reproduction, distribution, display, etc.) that are equivalent to
one of the exclusive rights granted protection under the Copyright Act.69
This Comment will focus on the second prong of this test as it has been the
central source of conflict for idea submission cases like that of Larry
Montz.70 Resolving these cases requires determining whether the asserted
67 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616, 619 (2008)
(describing how under preemption, courts consider whether a state law claim interferes with the
purposes of federal law).
68 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997). Copyright
protection is available to original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Works
of authorship include: “(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; and (8) architectural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Ideas are not included in these
categories but would still be able to meet the “subject matter” requirement for preemption because
copyrightable material can contain uncopyrightable elements such as ideas, thereby applying
preemption to uncopyrightable and copyrightable elements. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at
849; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983)
(noting that even though an original work of authorship contains uncopyrightable elements, the work as
a whole is not taken outside of preemption). A plaintiff will try to argue against preemption by claiming
that ideas captured in a body of work do not fall under the Copyright Act because the Act specifically
denies protection to ideas. See U.S. Ex Rel. Berge v. Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th
Cir. 1997). The umbrella that encompasses what is included in preemption is wider than the umbrella
encompassing what is protected by the Copyright Act. Id. (holding that “scope and protection are not
synonyms” and that “the shadow actually cast by the Act’s preemption is notably broader than the wing
of its protection”); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2001) (focusing on the
Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits that have held subject matter to include not only tangible
expressions but also elements of expression that are not protected under the Copyright Act). Even
though ideas are not covered under federal copyright law, they do not automatically fail the subject
matter requirement. See Murray Hill Publ’ns v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 636 (6th Cir.
2001) (emphasizing that the expression of an idea is the “essence of the subject matter” of copyright);
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 849 (noting that uncopyrightable and copyrightable elements of
state law claims can be preempted); Boyle v. Stephens Inc., No. 97 CIV 1351(SAS), 1998 WL 690816,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1998) (clarifying that preemption extends beyond copyrightable and protected
works of authorship and encompasses uncopyrightable elements).
69 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 848. See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 727
(Cal.Ct.App. 2002) (stating that if the claim based on a state-protected right is infringed by
“reproduction, performance, distribution or display,” then it is equivalent to a federal exclusive right)
(citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §1.01 [B] [1], at 1-12
(Matthew Bender 2002).
When violation of a state law is based on an act incorporating elements beyond those of the exclusive
rights under copyright law, then the rights are not equivalent and the second prong fails. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 723 F.2d at 200. See also Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 455 (“asking whether the state
common law or statutory action at issue asserts rights that are the same as those protected under § 106
of the Copyright Act”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
equivalent rights to the exclusive rights granted under the Copyright Act are established in the laws of
each state).
70 Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Nathan
Smith, Comment, The Shrinkwrap Snafu: Untangling the “Extra Element” in Breach of Contract
Claims Based on Shrinkwrap Licenses, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1373, 1393 (2003) (observing how courts do
not “normally struggle” with the subject matter requirement but the equivalency prong is still debated);
Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters,
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state claim masks what is truly a copyright claim.71 The courts have
predominantly utilized the “extra element” test to answer that question.72
The “extra element” test measures the degree of equivalency between state
law claims and copyright claims.73 Furthermore, it determines whether
there is some factor that changes the “nature of the action so that it is
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim,” thereby taking
the claim outside the bounds of copyright law and avoiding preemption.74
A copyright holder has the right to reproduce, perform, distribute, and
display his work.75 Federal copyright infringement occurs when the
infringer obstructs those rights by reproducing, performing, distributing, or
displaying the copyright holder’s work.76 At the state level, if an act of
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display will by itself infringe a
state-created right on which the plaintiff brings a case, the state claim is
preempted.77 But if another element is required, instead of, or in addition
to, reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, to prove the state
claim, then there is an “extra element.”78

20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355, 370 (1998) (“Although the subject matter prong does not pose much
difficulty . . . the equivalent right prong is ambiguous.”).
71 See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (Mosk, J., concurring)
(“[T]he ‘fact-specific analysis’ is not easily workable, for it entails an evaluation in each case of the
nature of the claims”); Scott Faust, NLRB Acting General Counsel Clarifies Duty to Provide
Information
in
Bargaining,
PROSKAUER
(May
18,
2011),
http://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/nlrb/nlrb-acting-general-counsel-clarifies-duty-to-provideinformation-in-bargaining/ (“[C]ase-specific analysis has led to seemingly inconsistent results . . . .”).
But see Groubert v. Spyglass Entm’t Group, No. CV 02–01803–SVW, 2002 WL 2031271, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (quoting Fisher v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000) (recognizing
that a fact-specific approach was the sensible method to resolve the “general scope requirement” of
preemption)).
72 See Sefton v. Jew, 201 F. Supp. 2d 730, 745 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Alcatel USA, Inc. v.
DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 (5th Cir. 1999)); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd. 601 F.
Supp. 1523, 1535 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (noting that the “extra element” test is the prevailing test).
73 See Jay Rubin, Note, Television Formats: Caught in the Abyss of the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 661, 671 (2006) (stating that when the
court determines whether a state law claim asserts rights qualitatively different from the rights protected
under the Copyright Act, it does so under the “extra element” or “equivalency” test).
74 Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphasis
added). See Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d 446, 455–456 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the extra element
operates as an addition or substitute to the acts as defined in the exclusive rights of the Copyright Act,
which would satisfy the state-created cause of action); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2005) (noting that most circuits referred to the determination of equivalency as the “extra element
test”).
75 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
76 See LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 407 (“Copyright infringement occurs when a third party
violates one or more of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights as enumerated in § 106 of the 1976
Act.”).
77 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.01[B][1], at 1-12
(Matthew Bender 2011) (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 1-12 to 1-13 (emphasis added).
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE “EXTRA ELEMENT” TEST
The “extra element” test has invoked much criticism79 and attention
because of its uncertainty80 and lack of guidance.81 The test has been
criticized for giving the courts too much discretion,82 and inconsistent
results justify the intense scrutiny.83 This Comment focuses on the “extra
element” test in breach of implied contract claims.84 Three perspectives

Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 288 n.3.
See LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 540 (noting that the “extra element” test can’t be applied with
certainty); see also David B. Sandelands, Advisory, When Does Federal Copyright Law Preempt State
Contract
Law?,
ENTERPRISE
COUNSEL
GROUP
(July
24,
2003),
http://www.enterprisecounsel.com/WhenDoesFederalCopyrightLaw2003.pdf (noting that what exactly
constitutes an “extra element” is unclear).
81 See Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 37 (2007) (“[J]udicial application of the [“extra element”]
test to the large number and variety of claims has given rise to a host of interesting, controversial,
oftentimes troubling, and, not surprisingly, inconsistent decisions.”).
82 See Schulyer M. Moore, Straightening Out Copyright Preemption, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 201,
204 (2002) (stating that a court that wants to find preemption can do so because there is always a
difference, no matter how small, between state law and copyright law). See also Robert W. Clarida &
Robert J. Bernstein, New York and California Courts Split on Preemption of Idea Claims, N.Y. L.J.
(July
15,
2011),
available
at
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202501070033&New_York_and_Californi
a_Courts_Split_on_Preemption_of_Idea_Claims (“Unless and until [this] Court provides a uniform
interpretation for federal courts to follow, the outcome of preemption challenges to idea-submission
claims may be determined less by the intent of Congress than by the iron law of real estate: location,
location, location.”); Bayard, supra note 63, at 628 (proposing that Congress might have intended to
give discretion to courts in determining what state claims should survive preemption); Patrick
McNamara, Note, Copyright Preemption: Effecting the Analysis Prescribed by Section 301, 24 B.C. L.
REV., 963, 972 (1983) (stating that judicial interpretation dominated the realm of copyright and
copyright preemption).
83 If a plaintiff brought a breach of implied contract claim based on idea submissions in the
Second or Fourth Circuit state courts, the court generally found the claim to be preempted. For Second
Circuit cases, see, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir.
1983) (preempted), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Forest Park Pictures v. Universal
Television Network, 10 Civ. 5168, 2011 WL 1792587, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011) (preempted),
vacated, 683 F.3d 424 (2d Cir. 2012); Muller v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d
429, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (preempted); Smith v. New Line Cinema, 03 Civ. 5274, 2004 WL 2049232,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (preempted). For Fourth Circuit cases, see, e.g., Nichols Agency, Inc. v.
Enchanted Child Care, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d. 774, 783 (D. Md. 2008) (preempted); Madison River
Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (M.D. N.C. 2005) (preempted);
U.S. ex. rel. Berge v. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1465 (4th Cir. 1997)
(preempted); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000) (preempted).
In the Ninth Circuit, courts found that breach of implied contract claims were not preempted. See, e.g.,
Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d. 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (not preempted); Benay v. Warner
Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (not preempted); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (not preempted); Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1128
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (not preempted).
The Sixth Circuit has taken both sides and found some breach of implied contract claims preempted
while finding others are not preempted. See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc.,
264 F.3d 622, 638 (6th Cir. 2001) (preempted), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130
S.Ct. 1237 (2010); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (not preempted).
84 The analysis will focus on breach of implied-in-fact contracts as opposed to breach of impliedin-law contracts since implied-in-law contracts are not promises manifested by the intentions of two
parties. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 51, at 19D-14. Implied-in-law contracts are imposed for reasons of
justice based on a derived benefit. Id. The implied-in-law contract merely depends on unauthorized use,
requiring no “extra element” of a promise to pay that would take such a claim outside of preemption.
79
80
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characterize the application of the “extra element” test to breach of contract
claims: (1) the minority view where breach of contract claims concerning
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of a copyrighted work
are never preempted;85 (2) an alternative view that finds state breach of
contract actions are always preempted;86 and (3) the majority view where
breach of contract causes of action are not preempted when they enforce
rights qualitatively different from those exclusively protected by copyright
law.87
A. Breach of Contract Claims Are Never Preempted
A few courts have held that a breach of contract case based on
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of copyrighted material
is never preempted. The inherent promise in a contract is the “extra
element” that sets a contract claim apart from a copyright case.88
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,89 the court emphasized that “[a]
copyright is a right against the world,” restricting strangers in what they
can do.90 An equivalent state right would have the power to restrict
strangers from acting.91 But state rights created by a contract affect only
their parties, not strangers outside the contract.92 A right enforceable
against a particular party is not equivalent to a right enforceable against the
world.93 A contract therefore does not create rights equivalent to the
exclusive rights granted in federal copyright law because a contract right
cannot be enforced against strangers to the contract.94 Even though the
court intends to avoid adopting a blanket statement that every contract
claim escapes preemption,95 the court’s holding does exactly the opposite.
It establishes that contract rights are different from rights under copyright
law in all cases.96 The court’s opinion asks, “[a]re rights created by contract
Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 459.
85 See infra Part III(A) (discussing the reasoning of a number of courts for finding an extra
element in every breach of contract cause of action).
86 See infra Part III(B) (discussing how a court can presumptively find preemption in all breach
of contract cases).
87 See infra Part III(C) (discussing how a majority of courts are not quick to conclude that every
breach of contract cause of action is preempted).
88 See Sandelands, supra note 80; Aileen Brophy, Whose Idea Is It Anyway? Protecting Idea
Purveyors and Media Producers After Grosso v. Miramax, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 507, 522
(2005) (“[C]ontract rights are inherently different from the rights granted by copyright.”).
89 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
90 Id. at 1454.
91 Id.
92 Id. See also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that a contract requires
the offeree to exchange a requested performance or promise for the offeror’s promise); JEFFREY
FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 7 (LexisNexis 2004) (observing how the
freedom of contract is based on the principle that every individual “is in the best position to know what
is in his or her own best interest, and should be free to pursue that interest”).
93 Brophy, supra note 88, at 522.
94 Id.
95 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
96 See Bayard, supra note 82, at 617 (“[T]he opinion’s [(ProCD)] language and logic tell a
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‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright‘?” The court answers “no.”97 The court’s answer is absolute and
without qualification, leaving little possibility for overlap between
copyright and contract rights.98 The court thus renders the preemption
mechanism inoperative.
Academics in the copyright field, such as Professor Paul Goldstein,99
also support the reasoning portrayed in ProCD. Professor Goldstein takes
ProCD a step further,100 saying, “contract law is a good example of a state
law that will be immune from preemption under the extra element test. . . .
[C]ontract law requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a bargainedfor exchange—something it need not prove in a cause of action for
copyright infringement.”101 Just like the court in ProCD, Professor
Goldstein does not otherwise qualify his statement with exceptions to
immunity, appearing to infer that contract claims will always be immune.102
Under this line of reasoning, the “bargained-for exchange” part of every
contract103 is the “extra element” that allows a breach of contract claim to
avoid preemption in every case.104
The danger in following this rationale is that anything labeled
“contract” will escape preemption.105 This includes contracts, which
promise to refrain from doing what copyright law already prohibits:
contracts promising not to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display a
work.106 Plaintiffs are therefore given a free pass to circumvent federal
copyright law, pursue a state claim, obtain a remedy under state law, and
virtually nullify the preemption mechanism.107 It is the court’s duty to
different story, in which it is indeed hard to imagine a contract claim not considered qualitatively
different.”).
97 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454.
98 Bayard, supra note 82, at 617.
99 Professor Paul Goldstein is a recognized scholar in the field of intellectual property law and
has authored a volume of books about the field including a treatise on copyright law, a casebook, and a
number of other books. Paul Goldstein, Stella W. and Ira S. Lillick Professor of Law, STANFORD LAW
SCHOOL DIRECTORY, http://www.law.stanford.edu/node/166390 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
100 See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (Mosk, J., concurring)
(“Professor Paul Goldstein, in his highly-regarded work on copyright, presents an even broader concept
of the contract exemption from federal copyright preemption.”).
101 Id. (quoting 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §15.2.1, at 15:12 (2d ed. 2002 supp.)).
102 See id.
103 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that consideration is generally
required in agreements and then describing that consideration is “bargained for by the promisor, and
exchanged by the promisee in return for the promisor’s promise”).
104 See Kabehie, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737 (Mosk, J., concurring).
105 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 77, at 1–23 (footnotes omitted) (“[P]re-emption should continue to
strike down claims that, though denominated ‘contract,’ nonetheless complain directly about the
reproduction of expressive materials.”); LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 539 (stating that ProCD takes an
extreme view of “freedom of contract,” allowing no contract to be preempted).
106 See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also Wrench LLC
v. Taco Bell Corp. 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Under [the] rationale, a contract which consisted
only of a promise not to reproduce the copyrighted work would survive preemption even though it was
limited to one of the exclusive rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106.”).
107 See Kabehie, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732; see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532,
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avoid drawing a quick conclusion from the pleaded “laundry list” of
elements in state law claims and to analyze whether an “extra element”
truly exists.108
B. Breach of Contract Claims Are Always Preempted
At least one court has found that breach of contract claims are always
preempted by federal copyright law, and another court came very close to
reaching that conclusion.109
In Wolff v. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.,110 a
photographer sued an engineering society for exceeding the rights that the
photographer originally granted to the society for use of a photograph.111
The court held that copyright law preempted the plaintiff’s state law claim
for breach of contract,112 relying heavily on congressional intent and
Congress’s actions when enacting the preemption provision of the
Copyright Act.113
The current preemption section of the Copyright Act describes
preempted claims in a generalized way.114 However, the House of
Representatives Committee Report to the Copyright Act illustrates that an
earlier draft of the preemption provision explicitly listed specific causes of
actions that would not be preempted, including breach of contract.115 That
portion of the Act was eliminated on the floor of the House and does not

1550 (11th Cir. 1996) (observing how a plaintiff can dress up a copyright infringement claim with a
state law claim by “artful pleading and presentation of evidence”); LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 539
(observing that the balance copyright law strikes is at risk).
108 Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2001); see ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding courts should not presumptively conclude that
anything labeled as “contract” avoids preemption); Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 457 (distinguishing that
even though some state contract claims avoid preemption does not mean that all state contract actions
do the same simply because they have the additional element of a promise); Endemol Entm’t B.V. v.
Twentieth Television, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1528 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that the promise not to
benefit from a copyrighted work, without more, is an insufficient “extra element”); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at *14, Miramax Film Corp. v. Grosso, 383 F.3d 965 (2004) (No. 04–1682), 2005 WL
1403156 at 3 (observing the necessity of courts to look beyond the label and the conclusory allegations
of a state law cause of action).
109 See Kabehie, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 n.6 (stating that several authorities have ascribed this
classification to a case).
110 768 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
111 See id. at 67 (showing that the invoice containing the conditions of use had a “time limit on
use,” but the defendant went on to use the photograph beyond the time limit without the plaintiff’s
consent).
112 Id. at 69.
113 Id.; see also Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., 935 F. Supp. 425, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(explaining that Wolff rests almost entirely on legislative history).
114 Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd. 601 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
115 See H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 132 (1976) (“Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of
parties to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract . . . .”). The preemption statute
allows the pursuit of claims under state law including: “misappropriation . . . breaches of contract,
breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices.”
Id. at 24.
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appear in the final version of the Copyright Act.116 The removal arguably
illustrates that Congress intended those causes of action to be preempted.117
The Wolff court, in fact, inferred “[w]here Congress includes limiting
language in an earlier version of a bill, but deletes it prior to enactment, it
may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”118 The court
interpreted Congress’ deletion of the provision protecting breach of
contract claims from preemption to mean that such claims should always be
preempted.119
But subsequent courts have indicated that Wolff goes too far in
interpreting congressional intent.120 One possible explanation that has been
offered for Congress’ action is that House members were concerned that an
explicit list would cause confusion about the scope of preemption,
especially since the list was non-exhaustive.121 The purported danger was
that clearly identifying non-preempted rights would give states a green
light to pass laws concerning those rights, thereby rendering preemption
useless.122 The bill was therefore revised to account for the possibility of
ambiguity and to maintain the power of preemption.123
The courts have been reluctant to follow Wolff’s dispositive
determination of congressional intent derived from the omission of
examples of non-preempted rights from the final version of the Copyright
Act.124 Rather, courts have regarded Wolff as standing for the proposition

17 U.S.C. § 301.
Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)
Wolff, 768 F. Supp. at 69 (citing Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)).
See id. at 69; see also Architectronics, Inc., 935 F. Supp. at 440 (noting that the Wolff court
held all contract claims preempted without considering whether a promise could ever be the “extra
element” to take a state claim outside of preemption).
120 See Architectronics, Inc., 935 F. Supp. at 441 (“However, there is nothing in the legislative
history or elsewhere to suggest that this was the motive behind the deletion.”); LEAFFER, supra note 66,
at 535 (noting that the legislative history in this particular situation is too ambiguous to provide any
insight to determine whether a right is equivalent); 1 NIMMER, supra note 77, at 1–16 (indicating that
the Wolff court’s logic was faulty because under that logic, it could be argued that the originally
enumerated claims would be deemed non-preempted but then the non-enumerated causes of action
could be held to be preempted).
121 See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.
1993) (explaining how congressional members were concerned about the tort of misappropriation that
was added to the list of the examples and thus decided to do away with the list altogether to avoid
confusion).
122 Id. at 434 n.5 (stating that the inclusion of a specific example of a non-preempted cause of
action like misappropriation could be interpreted by the courts as authorizing states to pass
misappropriation laws).
123 Id. (noting a concern presented by a representative that the inclusion of “misappropriation”
would inadvertently nullify the preemption section of the Copyright Act because its inclusion would
indicate to courts that the states are authorized to pass misappropriation laws and such laws would
render preemption meaningless). The main concern with “misappropriation” sounded a death knell for
the entire list altogether. Id. (stating that the amendment to strike the examples list was “merely to
remove the specific reference to misappropriation”).
124 See Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[I]t
seems that no inference as to Congress’s intent may be drawn from the fact that the illustrative list was
dropped from the statute as it was finally enacted.”).
116
117
118
119
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that a breach of contract claim is preempted when a plaintiff alleges that
copyright infringement caused the breach of contract.125
The case of Endemol Entertainment B.V. v. Twentieth Television,
Inc.,126 came dangerously close to articulating a categorical rule similar to
Wolff: a breach of an implied contract, in particular, is always preempted.127
The plaintiff in this case hoped to license his television program concept
and format.128 The defendant expressed an interest in the concept and
format.129 During negotiations, both parties understood that the plaintiff
would be paid for any use of his ideas.130 The defendant started to market
the television series without the plaintiff’s permission.131 The plaintiff and
defendant later broke off negotiations when no agreement could be
reached.132 The defendant then produced a pilot based on the format and
concept of the plaintiff’s program.133 The court found that the plaintiff’s
claim alleged no rights beyond the defendant’s promise not to benefit from
the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, which did not rise to the level of an “extra
element.”134 The promise not to benefit was not an “extra element” because
copyright law already protects a copyright holder from an infringer who
benefits from the work.135 The defendant in this case received the benefit of
the plaintiff’s work.136 Copyright law alone could effectively protect the
plaintiff’s rights and therefore preempted the breach of contract claim.137
Citing Professor Nimmer for the proposition that “quasi-contracts” are
preempted, the Endemol court concluded that implied contracts are a
species of quasi-contracts and should therefore be preempted in all cases.138
A number of courts have followed the same line of thought.139 However,
Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 991 F.2d at 431.
48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
See id. at 1528 (stating that an implied contract is an exception to the assertion that contract
claims are not preempted). One of the concerns expressed by those who support preemption of impliedin-fact contract claims is that the Copyright Act will become obsolete as the states’ power grows. See
Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that “if the language of the act could be so
easily circumvented, the preemption provision [of the Copyright Act] would be useless, and the policies
behind a uniform Copyright statute would be silenced.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting how states will interfere with the national objectives and regulatory
systems of the national government).
128 Endemol Entertainment B.V., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1525.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1528.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See id. (“Plaintiff’s claim asserts no violation of rights separate from those copyright law was
designed to protect and, consequently, is preempted by federal law.”).
138 See id. at 1528 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.01[B][1][a], [g] at 1-19, 1-34 (Matthew Bender 1997) (“‘[C]ontract causes of action themselves are
not typically pre-empted,’ but . . . implied contracts as a species of quasi contract ‘should be regarded as
an equivalent right and pre-empted insofar as it applies to copyright subject matter.’”).
139 See, e.g., Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059
125
126
127
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courts have mistakenly interpreted Professor Nimmer’s work because a
“quasi-contract” is merely a type of implied contract rather than a term
incorporating all implied contracts. A “quasi-contract” is an implied-in-law
contract, as opposed to an implied-in-fact contract.140 The focus of cases
like Endemol has been the implied-in-fact contract where the parties’
actions reflect a mutual understanding of a promise to pay for the use of
ideas.141 The “quasi-contract” has little value in analyzing situations where
implied-in-fact contracts are in dispute. Professor Nimmer addresses the
distinction: “[Q]uasi-contract refers to an obligation imposed by law to
avoid unjust enrichment. It is therefore . . . pre-empted . . . . Unfortunately,
courts often refer to ‘implied-in-fact’ contracts as pre-empted, when they
mean to declare implied-in-law (i.e., quasi-) contract[s]” as preempted.142
Professor Nimmer further clarifies that “implied-in-fact” contracts survive
preemption.143 As a result, the Endemol court’s analysis became misguided
when it introduced quasi-contract theories to its preemption analysis of an
implied-in-fact contract.
The critical difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an
implied-in-law contract is the existence of an “extra element.”144 The “extra
element” in an implied-in-fact contract claim is the promise to pay, while
an implied-in-law contract does not require an “extra element” beyond
reproduction, performance, distribution or display.145 The former typically
avoids preemption and the latter results in preemption of state claims.
Therefore, the interchangeable use of the term “implied contract” in
reference to both an “implied-in-fact” contract and an “implied-in-law”

(C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Implied contracts are more often found to be preempted.”); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that a majority of courts have found implied
contracts preempted by the Copyright Act); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff’s breach of implied contract based on meetings and
discussions to market a film screenplay was preempted because the implied contract was a species of
quasi contract).
140 See Ferriell & Navin, supra note 92, at 9–10 (stating that a contract implied in law is
sometimes called a “quasi-contract”).
141 See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923) (describing an “implied
in fact” agreement as inferred from the conduct of the parties showing their mutual understanding and
meeting of the minds and an “implied in law” agreement as imposed by the fiction of law to perform a
legal duty).
142 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19D.03[C][2], at 19D33 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2011) (footnotes omitted).
143 See id. at 19D-33 n.71.
144 Celestial Mechanix, Inc. v. Susquehanna Radio Corp., No. CV 03-5834-GHK, 2005 WL
4715213, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
145 Id., see also Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish that a defendant breached an implied-in-fact contract would also
have to prove elements beyond unauthorized use, including that the defendant made an enforceable
promise to pay and breached that promise.”); LORD, supra note 17, at 41 (commenting on how language
is susceptible to vagueness so that the same words could be used to convey different meanings).
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contract can distort the preemption analysis.146 Courts and commentators
must be careful to keep the two distinctly separate.147
Rather than conducting an intensive analysis of the facts, the Wolff
and Endemol courts adhered to the view that breach of contract claims are
always preempted by federal copyright law. A fact-heavy analysis of the
rights that each plaintiff claimed may have yielded different results and
offered guidance to courts navigating similar claims.
C. Breach of Contract Claims Are Not Preempted When They Enforce
Rights Qualitatively Different From the Exclusive Rights of
Copyright Law
Many courts have gravitated away from adopting a bright-line rule
and towards a fact-specific analysis to determine whether a breach of
contract claim protects rights that are qualitatively different from rights
under copyright law.148 Courts are valuing substance over form so that
plaintiffs can no longer disguise a federal copyright claim as a state law
claim.149
In Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.,150 Taco Bell expressed an interest
in using a “Psycho Chihuahua” cartoon from a licensing trade show.151 In
later discussions with Taco Bell, one of the cartoon creators suggested
using a live dog that would be given personality through computer
imaging.152 The two parties discussed how much it would cost to use the
“Psycho Chihuahua” character and Taco Bell understood that if it chose to
use the Psycho Chihuahua concept, it would have to pay the cartoonists.153
The creators’ licensing agency sent a proposal to Taco Bell, laying out the
fees.154 Taco Bell did not accept the proposal nor did Taco Bell explicitly
reject it or indicate that it would stop any further discussions.155 The
cartoonists then gave a formal presentation to Taco Bell’s marketing
department where they submitted prospective promotional materials
focused on the “Psycho Chihuahua” and orally conveyed specific ideas for

146 See Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 109 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the
difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an implied-in-law contract is “fuzzy”).
147 See LORD, supra note 17, at 41 (noting how the use of “implied contract” causes great
confusion in cases and among lawyers).
148 See Anschell et al., supra note 14, at 24; see also Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Comm’ns,
Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 636 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that a preemption analysis is dependent largely on
the facts and the claims presented by each of the parties); Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. v. Fireworks
Ent’mt, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that a copyright preemption analysis
is a “claim-by-claim inquiry”); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000)
(finding that a “categorical rule for preemption of implied-in-fact contracts would be inappropriate”).
149 Anschell, supra note 14, at 24.
150 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
151 Id. at 449.
152 Id. at 450.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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television commercials.156 Taco Bell later hired a different advertising
agency and sent the hired agency all of the “Psycho Chihuahua” materials
from Taco Bell’s advertising department.157 Taco Bell later aired a
Chihuahua commercial and based its marketing efforts around a Chihuahua
without compensating the designers of “Psycho Chihuahua.”158
The Wrench court found that the “extra element” in the state law
breach of implied contract claim was the promise to pay.159 The court
examined the action that violated the implied contract and concluded that
the violating act was not one of reproduction, performance, distribution or
display by itself, but of the failure to pay.160 A copyright holder retains
rights of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display,161 but
noticeably absent from this list is the right to payment.162 Failing to pay
does not violate federal copyright law.163 Therefore, the court held that
together, the use of the work (which could infringe on copyright) and the
failure to pay violated the contract.164 However, the use of the work alone
could not violate the contract.165
The court emphasized that the qualitative difference from a copyright
infringement claim arose from the required elements to prove the state
breach of contract claim: an enforceable promise, a breach, proof of mutual
assent, consideration, the value of the work, and the defendant’s use of the
work.166 It was significant, therefore, that the elements necessary to prove

Id.
Id. at 451. The materials most likely consisted of art boards the creators put together; Psycho
Chihuahua shirts, hats, and stickers for promotional purposes; materials the designers’ newly-hired
licensing agent sent to the employee for presentation to Taco Bell’s outside advertising agency, which
described the Chihuahua as “irreverent,” edgy,” and “spicy,” with a craving for Taco Bell food; the
ideas and examples from a Taco Bell marketing department meeting; and samples of uniform designs,
shirts, food wrappers, posters, and cup designs based on the proposed ideas at the marketing meeting.
Id. at 450–51.
158 Id. at 451. During the Taco Bell marketing meeting, the creators came up with the idea for a
television commercial where a male dog would pass up a female dog to get to Taco Bell food. Id. at
450. The new advertising agency claimed that it came up with the idea for the broadcasted Taco Bell
commercial, where a male Chihuahua passes a female Chihuahua to get to a person eating Taco Bell
food, while two of the creative directors were eating Mexican food at a café and saw a Chihuahua
walking down the street “on a mission.” Id. at 451. Thus, Taco Bell used the independent creation
defense to show that it came up with the commercial independently from the creators of the “Psycho
Chihuahua.” Id. at 459.
159 Id. at 456.
160 Id.
161 See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
162 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001).
163 See id. (“[T]he state law right is not abridged by an act which in and of itself would infringe
one of the exclusive rights granted by § 106, since the right to be paid for the use of the work is not one
of those rights.”).
164 Id.
165 Id. (“It is not the use of the work alone but the failure to pay for it that violates the contract and
gives rise to the right to recover damages.”).
166 Id.
156
157
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the state breach of implied contract were distinct from the elements of a
copyright infringement claim.167
The court also looked at the different remedies available through the
state law claim versus a copyright claim to find a qualitative difference. 168
The court took note of the fact that breach of implied contract actions in the
state allowed for recovery of the reasonable value of services rendered.169
The remedies for a copyright infringement action, on the other hand,
include injunctions,170 impounding and destruction of infringing articles,171
damages and profits,172 and costs and attorney’s fees.173 For the plaintiffs to
receive the remedy of reasonable value of services rendered, they had to
sue under a breach of contract claim.174 In Wrench, the reasonable value of
services rendered would most likely consist of the time spent to develop,
(1) the promotional materials submitted to Taco Bell’s advertising
department, and (2) the ideas that were designed to appeal to the Taco Bell
marketing team.175 The creators undertook their work with the expectation
that they would be paid.176 Therefore, the remedies under the state law

167 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 625 (explaining how the elements in state law claims are not
ostensibly identical to the elements of a copyright infringement claim); see also Chandler v. Roach, 319
P.2d 776, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (stating that the elements of an implied-in-fact contract are mutual
assent and consideration); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (stating that protection for a breach of contract is not the same as copyright protection).
168 See Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001). But see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], at 1-12 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2011) (footnote
omitted) (“Even if additional remedies might exist under state law, the claim is pre-empted absent a
showing of different rights.”); Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 991 F.2d
426, 435 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the state law cause of action cannot be preempted merely because
the remedy for the breach of contract is identical to a remedy in copyright).
169 Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 456.
170 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (stating that a court can grant a temporary or final injunction to
prevent or restrain copyright infringement).
171 See 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006) (stating that a court can impound the copies made or used as part
of the copyright infringement as well as the means used to produce the copies, and a court can order the
destruction of the copies and means used in copyright infringement); see also 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006),
House Report no. 94-1476, Historical and Revision Notes (“[T]he court could order the infringing
articles sold, delivered to the plaintiff, or disposed of in some other way that would avoid needless
waste and best serve the ends of justice.”).
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (stating that a copyright infringer is liable for (1) actual damages
and any additional profits, or (2) statutory damages).
In the case of actual damages, the copyright owner just has to prove the infringer’s gross revenue. See
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006). The copyright owner can elect to take actual damages or statutory damages.
Id. The damages are granted to make the copyright owner whole from the losses suffered by
infringement, and profits are given to prevent the infringer from wrongfully benefitting from his
actions. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), House Report no. 94-1476, Historical and Revision Notes.
173 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
174 The payment of reasonable value of services rendered is a remedy available for breach of
implied contracts. Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 1258, 1268 (Wash. 2008).
175 “Reasonable value” is what the other party “received in terms of what it would have cost him
to obtain it from a person in the claimant’s position.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371
(1981). It is usually based on market value. Id. at cmt. a.
176 See Cascaden v. Magryta, 225 N.W. 511, 511–12 (Mich. 1929) (holding that the plaintiffs
could not recover under an implied-in-fact contract because the work was not done, which would have
allowed the plaintiffs to form an expectation of payment from the defendants).
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claim made it qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim.177
The Wrench court did not adhere to a bright-line rule to resolve the
preemption issue, but instead, went through a step-by-step analysis of the
infringing action, the elements of proof, and the available remedies to
conclude that the claim was qualitatively different as to avoid
preemption.178
Fischer v. Viacom International, Inc.179 also follows the fact-specific
approach by looking at the particular rights at issue to determine if the
claim is preempted.180 The plaintiff in Fischer developed an animated
character team of “a guy named ‘Steve’ and his blue dog named
‘Bluey.’”181 He drafted a written proposal for an animated television series
based on the character team and submitted it to Nickelodeon U.K.182
Nickelodeon asked for permission from the plaintiff to allow Viacom,
Nickelodeon’s parent company, to keep “the details of the series on file for
future reference.”183 The plaintiff responded by sending a more detailed
description, a script for a pilot of the animated show, a sheet that displayed
the characters in different poses, and character descriptions.184 The plaintiff
and Viacom continued their exchanges, and Viacom purportedly expressed
interest in the character team and encouraged the plaintiff to continue
developing it.185 The plaintiff was then told to “pursue the production of his
series” and he was given people to contact.186 Based on this
encouragement, the plaintiff produced a five-minute video and sent it to
Nickelodeon.187 The plaintiff was then sent a release to sign, 188 whereupon
he broke off all contact with Nickelodeon so that he could retain the rights
to his work.189 Nickelodeon never returned any of the plaintiff’s
materials.190 The plaintiff subsequently discovered a show similar in design
177 See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the
qualitative difference is reflected in the different remedy granted under a state law claim). But see Am.
Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm’t Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 932 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that there
is “no authority for the novel proposition that a ‘qualitative difference’ between the state law claim and
the copyright claim may be supplied by a difference in damages claimed for the same basic wrong”).
178 See Steven T. Lowe, Preemptive Strike, 26 L.A. LAW 37, 38 (2003) (“The majority of federal
and state courts that have addressed preemption defenses to breach of contract claims have required a
fact-specific analysis that inquires whether the promise underlying the contract is essentially nothing
more than a promise not to violate federal copyright law.”).
179 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 2000).
180 See id. at 542 (stating that the better approach is to look at the contractual rights to determine
equivalency).
181 Id. at 537.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 537–38.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text (discussing releases).
189 Fisher, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
190 Id.
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to his animated character team of Steve and Bluey had aired on
Nickelodeon.191
Similar to Wrench, the Fischer court examined the payment right
created by the implied contract and the plaintiff’s expectation of payment if
his idea was used.192 However, unlike Wrench, the court found that the
rights in the implied contract were equivalent to the rights under copyright
law, focusing on the implied contract’s role as a tool to restrict use by
someone other than the plaintiff.193 The court appeared to not place too
much emphasis on “payment,” as it regarded the contract as pure regulation
of “use” rather than regulation of payment.194
Similarly, in Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp.,195 the court scrutinized
the nature of the plaintiff’s allegations to conclude that copyright law
preempted the implied-in-fact contract claim.196 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant agreed to pay him and give him screen credit if his ideas
were used to produce and distribute a film.197 The plaintiff had submitted
his screenplay for a movie entitled “Doubletime” to New Line Cinema,
whereupon “New Line informed [him] that it had recently produced a
‘time-travel’ film and ‘it was therefore reluctant to produce another film
that employed transitions in time as a central element.’”198 New Line
sustained a relationship with the plaintiff by requesting any future drafts of
“Doubletime,”199 and New Line later purchased a screenplay entitled
“Frequency” with the same premise.200 The court found that any restriction
on use of the plaintiff’s ideas strictly fell within the Copyright Act.201 The
court believed that the plaintiff alleged no additional rights beyond the right
to use his own work as he pleased.202 The implied contract, as framed by
the court, did not control conduct beyond the use of the plaintiff’s ideas.203
The court overlooked the plaintiff’s demand for compensation, finding that
the right to use the plaintiff’s idea was equivalent to the rights granted
under federal copyright law and therefore preempted.204
The court in Idema v. Dreamworks205 also emphasized the
appropriateness of a fact-specific analysis, focusing on the actual

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id.
96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
Id. at 1061–62.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1055.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1061–62.
See id.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
162 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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allegations at issue and the “gravamen” of the state law claim.206 The
plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied contract was based on the studio’s
understanding that the plaintiff’s story could only be used if the plaintiff
was paid and on the studio’s knowledge that the plaintiff already prepared
book and movie proposals.207 Unlike Selby and Fischer, the court
concluded that the “extra element” was the exchange of promises, relying
on more than acts of reproduction, copying, distribution, or performance.208
It is apparent from the varied applications of the “extra element” test
that the courts’ conclusions were primarily shaped by how they framed
their analyses and how they chose to perceive the allegations—focusing on
prohibiting use or focusing on compensation.209 Even the Idema court
recognized that it could have held the breach of contract claim preempted,
stating:
Though it is certainly possible that this claim is preempted, in whole, or in part,
by the Copyright Act, that preemption is not clear to this Court (a subsequent
state court is certainly empowered, with greater elucidation of the factual
allegations underpinning the claim, to make its own findings about preemption
under copyright).210

A fact-specific analysis, therefore, will yield different results.211 As
depicted above, similar factual situations have led to conflicting findings,
yet the courts have not established a consistent, factually-based method to
determine whether there is an “extra element.” The division among the
circuits will further deepen as courts commit to applying their own tests
and theories to copyright preemption cases.212 The uncertainty in the court
system trickles down to impact business operations as writers, producers,
and studios become apprehensive of their legal rights.213 A coherent
procedure to analyze state law claims for an “extra element” is necessary to
sustain the flow of everyday business and to guide the courts in their
decision-making.214

206 See id. at 1190 (describing how the court looks at the asserted state law claims in comparison
to a federal copyright claim).
207 Id. at 1172–73.
208 Id. at 1191.
209 See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000) (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential or analytical
pattern.”).
210 Idema, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1195
211 See Dinh, supra note 209, at 2085 (observing that the nature of the preemption analysis partly
explains the indeterminancy of court decisions).
212 Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, No. 11–143, 2011 WL 3380764, at *11 (U.S. Aug.
2, 2011) (noting that the court’s holding that the breach of contract claim was not equivalent to any of
the rights under copyright law would further deepen a longstanding circuit split).
213 Brophy, supra note 88, at 515.
214 Circuit Split Warrants Review of Copyright Act Preemption, TV Studios Say, 20 MEALEY’S
LITIG. REP. INTELL. PROP. 25 (2011) (noting that nationwide copyright uniformity is important).
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IV. SELBY CHARTS THE PATH FOR A DEFINITIVE APPLICATION OF THE
“EXTRA ELEMENT” TEST
The significance of Selby is not its holding, but its review of the
ProCD decision, which, as explained in Part IIIA, articulated that breach of
contract claims are never preempted.215 The Selby court essentially
criticized the characterization of a promise to pay as an “extra element” in
the preemption analysis.216 The Selby court stated, “the very promise is so
inextricably entwined with the copyright that to permit the promisee to sue
upon it would undermine the preemption feature of the Copyright Act.”217
In other words, allowing a copyright holder to pursue a breach of contract
claim would weaken the power of copyright preemption because payment
for the benefit of a copyrighted work is already embodied in the rights
granted to a copyright holder and thus governed by copyright law. The
Selby court does not go so far to say that a payment promise preempts a
breach of contract claim in every case, but only that under the particular
facts of Selby, the promise was woven into the screenplay owner’s
copyright. The Selby court’s use of the words “inextricably entwined”
shapes this Comment’s proposal for a better copyright preemption system
based on the facts of any given case.
A.

Connecting “Inextricably Entwined” to Constitutional Law
Similar to the way that Selby’s use of the term draws attention, the
Supreme Court heavily relied on the term “entwine” in a notable decision.
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association,218 the phrase “pervasive entwinement” was coined as a way to
determine if state action existed when a constitutional question was brought
before a court. State action is any action that is taken by the government, or
on behalf of the government, especially in the context of constitutional
law.219 The “pervasive entwinement” test evaluated whether the conduct of
a private actor, such as an individual or business, was so closely tied to the
state as to attribute the private actor’s conduct to that of the state.220 If the
private actor’s conduct was so pervasively entwined with the state, then
state action existed and the private actor is deemed to have essentially acted

See Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
Id. at 1060. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers with
following the courts and commentators who find that breach of contract claims are never preempted).
217 Selby, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (emphasis added). The hypothetical that the Selby court lays out
is: “Suppose, e.g., that the defendant promised ‘I will not infringe any copyright or copyright protection
in the script you are proposing to show me.’” Id. The promise is one to follow federal copyright law.
218 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
219 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1538 (9th ed. 2009).
220 See Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s Application to Amateur
Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 186 (2008); see also Lisa Mastrogiovanni, Case Note, Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 121 S. Ct. 924 (2001), 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
711, 713 (2002) (stating that the Supreme Court implemented a new method to find state action).
215
216
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as the state.221 Significantly, the test analyzed when one type of action
resembled another action in such a striking way that one took on the
character and identity of the other.222 Even though the Supreme Court did
not specifically define “entwinement,”223 it illustrated what entwinement
looks like in a heavily fact-centered inquiry.224
The defendant in the case was Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association (the “Association”), a membership organization set up to
regulate interscholastic sports among public and private schools in
Tennessee.225 The plaintiff was Brentwood Academy, a private school and
a member of the Association.226 Brentwood Academy challenged a rule
prohibiting the use of undue influence in recruiting athletes,227 claiming
that the Association’s enforcement of the rule constituted state action.228
The Court focused on the organization and composition of the Association
to conclude that it was “overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public
institutions and public officials . . . .”229 In other words, the Association, a
seemingly private institution, operated as a public, state organization,
composed of officials that were treated like state employees.230 The Court
recognized that the Association could not operate without the public school
officials who overwhelmingly managed the Association.231
Furthermore, Tennessee’s State Board of Education used its statutory
authority to expressly delegate power to the Association to regulate
interscholastic sports among Tennessee public schools.232 The State Board
of Education later dropped its endorsement of the Association.233 But the
Court found this irrelevant because a strong relationship still existed
between the Association and the State. The extensive involvement of public
221 The “state action” doctrine: private conduct does not have to comply with the Constitution
while actions of the state have to do so. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 486 (2d ed. 2002). The rights and liberties granted to individuals by the U.S. Constitution are
protected only against the government. STEVEN EMANUEL & LAZAR EMANUEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
417 (Aspen Publishers 26th ed. 2008). Where an individual asserts that his constitutional rights have
been violated, a court can hear a case only if there has been some participation by the government in the
challenged activity. Id.
222 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 303 (stating that pervasive entwinement can be shown by
relevant facts that point to overlapping identity).
223 Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 298 (noting that the inquiry is necessarily fact-bound). The Court made clear that the
character of an entity is not determined by its characterization in statutory law. Id. at 296.
225 Id. at 291.
226 Id. at 293.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 298.
230 Id. at 300.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 292 (observing that the State Board of Education had acknowledged the
Association’s functions by adopting a rule that designated the Association as “the organization to
supervise and regulate the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high schools in
Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis”). The State Board had the power to revoke that
designation by its own will. Id.
233 Id. at 300.
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employees at every level of the Association was a meaningful indicator of
entwinement.234 The private character of the Association merely masked
the State’s role, as the Association was acting as an arm of the State
through the Board of Education. The particular facts of Brentwood are not
significant to this Comment’s analysis of copyright preemption, but the
Court’s logic of how the private athletic association came to be “charged
with a public character” provides insight into how a copyright claim can be
masked as a state claim.235
The Brentwood court determined that “entwinement” is appropriate
when the facts justify labeling “an ostensibly private action as public
instead.”236 “[T]he relevant facts [may] show pervasive entwinement to the
point of largely overlapping identity . . . .”237 In other words, complete
entwinement might render two identities completely indistinguishable.238
But the Court also suggested that entwinement could be unwound if there
was an offsetting reason to differentiate the two identities.239 The Court
appears to indicate that an element may exist that takes private action out of
the public sphere in the same way that an “extra element” can save a state
law claim from federal copyright preemption. The Court’s reasoning might
be summed up with the duck test: “If it looks like a duck, swims like a
duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is probably a duck.”240 If it looks like
state action, and acts like state action, then it is probably state action.
Focusing on the Brentwood court’s interpretation of what it means for
two separate entities to be so entwined as to be inseparable, this Comment
proposes to apply the “pervasive entwinement” test to the analysis of
copyright preemption. The central question is whether copyright law is so
Id. at 301–02.
Id. It is particularly relevant that the Brentwood case did not set out any concrete factors or
elements as part of the “pervasive entwinement” test. See id. at 303 (“[N]o one criterion must
necessarily be applied.”). It focuses on the facts themselves to determine the real character of the entity
and describes entwinement as a general concept in an indirect way. Id. at 295 (“[N]o one fact can
function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of
circumstances absolutely sufficient . . . .”).
236 Id. at 303.
237 Id.
238 See id. at 300 (explaining that the minority of private schools kept the private organization
from being characterized as “public,” which kept total entwinement—where the identities of the private
organization and the State are totally indistinguishable—from occurring).
239 Id. at 291, 303 (holding that the private organization’s activity should be treated as that of the
State due to the pervasive entwinement of state officials in the organization and the absence of any
reason to see the organization’s actions in any other way).
240 See Bruce W. Jentleson, Beware the Duck Test, 34 WASH. QUARTERLY 137, 137 (Summer
2011) available at http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summerjentleson_0.pdf (explaining the origins
of the duck test). The duck test was proposed by a U.S. ambassador to explain why the United States
was scheming to take down the Guatemalan government: “Many times it is impossible to prove legally
that a certain individual is a communist; but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of
detection—the ‘duck test’ . . . .[If a] bird certainly looks like a duck. Also, he goes to the pond and you
notice he swims like a duck . . . . Well, by this time you’ve probably reached the conclusion that the
bird is a duck, whether he’s wearing a label or not.” Id. (quoting WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE
REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA 115–16 (W.W. Norton & Company 2d ed.
1993).
234
235
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entwined with a state law claim as to subject the claim to preemption.
Similar to its application in Brentwood, the entwinement test will continue
to uphold the fact-specific analysis used by many courts to find an “extra
element” and thus refrain from adopting a bright-line rule.241
The entwinement test will measure the degree to which federal
copyright law overcomes the identity of a state law cause of action.242
Complete entwinement would occur where copyright law completely
subsumes the state law claim, resulting in automatic preemption. For
example, in an action for breach of confidence where the plaintiff’s only
claim is that the defendant took the plaintiff’s materials and copied the
content and ideas thereby breaking the plaintiff’s confidence, copyright law
overrides the breach of confidence claim.243 Without showing any evidence
that a confidential relationship existed, copyright law is the only source of
authority that the plaintiff can rely on to assert his grievance in court. A
breach of confidence action requires a confidential relationship, but if no
such relationship exists, the plaintiff cannot use it as a weapon for
protection against a defendant’s unlawful use.244 Copyright law would be
the plaintiff’s most powerful resource, which he could employ to obtain a
remedy and reclaim his rights. It dictates the outcome where a copyright
thief impedes the plaintiff’s ability to control how his work is used.245
Copyright law, therefore, takes over the state law claim and preempts it
when complete entwinement occurs. The complete opposite takes place
when the two claims are not entwined: state law rules and there is no
preemption.
As an alternative to the “extra element” test, the entwinement test will
not necessarily draw a conclusion of whether a definitive “extra element”
exists or not. Instead, the “extra element” test will be folded into the
“pervasive entwinement” test. If a fact or set of facts unveils something

241 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 619 (“Categorical approaches to the issue of contract
preemption are antithetical to preemption law.”). A categorical rule based on the type of state law claim
is not helpful because it is possible for a state law claim to be found preempted in some situations and
not preempted in other situations, depending on the facts at hand. For example, a claim for conversion
is usually a distinct tort, but it can be preempted if it is alleged that a defendant used and distributed the
work. Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 992 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
242 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
243 See Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (examining the
plaintiff’s allegations of a breach of confidence claim where no “extra element” was found, even though
many courts have found that in a breach of confidence claim, the “extra element” is the confidential
relationship or mutual understanding between the parties).
244 “An actionable breach of confidence will arise when an idea, whether or not protectable, is
offered to another in confidence, and is voluntarily received by the offeree . . . [and used] for purposes
beyond the limits of the confidence without the offeror’s permission.” Tele-Count Eng’rs, Inc. v. Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). A breach of confidence claim focuses on
the nature of the relationship between the parties to the agreement. Rokos v. Peck, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480,
489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
245 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 557 (2008) (noting that the structural format of the Copyright Act “leans toward
protection”).
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akin to an “extra element,” entwinement is unwound as the state law claim
becomes more distinct from a copyright claim. But if the facts show no
“extra element,” the analysis does not end there. The “pervasive
entwinement” test will measure the degree to which a state-created right is
established, rather than whether it exists or not (which is what the “extra
element” test does). In other words, if it looks like copyright infringement
and acts like copyright infringement, then it probably is copyright
infringement.246
B. The Meaning of “Pervasive Entwinement” for Implied Contracts of
Payment in the Entertainment Industry
Applying the “pervasive entwinement” test to breach of implied
contract cases means evaluating the extent to which an implied contract has
created a right distinct from the rights asserted under copyright law. The
test will measure the strength with which the right to be paid has been
established. This will essentially come down to the expectations of
payment (the expectation of receiving payment and the expectation of
giving payment) between the parties involved.247 A plaintiff who has
proven a mutual understanding of the circumstances surrounding payment
in exchange for use would be justified in utilizing contract law to assert his
right to payment. In such an instance, contract law is the more appropriate
authority to obtain a remedy because it governs a bargained-for exchange
between two parties where expectations are thwarted.248 Copyright law
does not completely account for the situation because the right to regulate
the use of a work is only one component of the dispute; the mutual
expectation of the right to be paid is the other component.249 Where the
dual expectations of payment have not been recognized, or only minimally
established as part of an exchange, copyright law governs the reclamation
of rights to use a work.250 Copyright law is more pervasively entwined in
the alleged state law claim and preemption occurs. Therefore, the pervasive
entwinement test in the context of implied contracts will require an analysis
of each party’s expectations.
This Comment proposes not only to advance the entwinement test
utilized in constitutional law but also to set forth factors to guide the
analysis. The absence of a clear road-map in fact-specific, “extra element”

See supra note 240.
See BREIMER, supra note 11, at 168 (concluding that a contract can be established if it is clear
that the person disclosing an idea will be paid if the idea is used).
248 See MILLER, supra note 16, at 35 (explaining that under contract law, the party who made the
offer receives goods or services and the party who accepts the offer receives payment).
249 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 643 (explaining that contracts usually contain an additional
promise that is different in some way from the promise to not infringe an exclusive right of copyright).
250 See
Copyright Basics, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2, http://copyright.gov/circs/
circ1.pdf (last reviewed May 2012) (stating that copyright protection begins at the time the work is
created and the copyright immediately becomes the author’s property so that only the author or those
that receive rights through the author can rightfully claim copyright).
246
247
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preemption cases have led to the distinct split among the circuits.251 The
courts, employing a fact-specific analysis, have not articulated any method
of how they arrived at their conclusions.252 As previously stated,
categorical rules are the closest mechanism to a formulaic approach of
preemption: state law claims are always or never preempted.253 This
Comment resists the categorical rules in favor of a factual analysis and
further proposes four factors in considering whether a state law claim is
equivalent to a copyright infringement claim: (1) the history of the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, (2) the extent to which the
plaintiff and defendant are close to finalizing a deal, (3) the components of
the plaintiff’s allegations, and (4) the predominant rights to be protected in
the implied contract claim. The first two factors focus on the relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant rather than explicitly on whether a
copyright infringement claim and a state law claim intersect. But resolving
the state of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s expectations contributes to
measuring the extent to which a contract claim and a copyright claim are
entwined. The expectation levels of each party influence the type of claim
the plaintiff can pursue and the area of law under which the plaintiff can
best achieve relief.
1. First Factor: Course of Dealing Between the Plaintiff and
Defendant
An implied contract for payment is based on the circumstances
surrounding the idea disclosure.254 One such circumstance is the history of
the relationship between a plaintiff and defendant.255 As two parties come
into frequent contact with each other and engage in business deals, each
develops a better understanding of what the other expects from a
transaction.256 Included in those expectations are the details surrounding
compensation.257 The payment terms are controlled by the relationship

251 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 643 (stating that the “extra element” test is malleable and
provides little guidance to courts in determining whether claims should be preempted).
252 Id. at 627–28 (noting that it is unclear if the courts have done away with the “extra element”
test or have applied the “extra element” test in a different way, but it is clear that courts have not
analyzed equivalency in a technical way).
253 See id. at 629 (noting that the court’s analysis of preemption in breach of contract claims is
more categorical than the analysis of preemption in other state law claims).
254 See Thompson v. Cal. Brewing Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 783, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (stating that
the person who suggests an idea has a right to be paid when the circumstances of disclosing the idea
demonstrate that an agreement to be paid can be implied); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal.
1956) (explaining that a breach of contract claim can arise in a context where a contract can be implied
from the circumstances before and after disclosure, conveying the conduct of the offeree or offeror who
suggest they understand there is an obligation to pay at stake).
255 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text.
256 See Vanderpool v. Higgs, 690 P.2d 391, 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (“Contract law protects the
expectation interest of contracting parties based on a voluntary agreement that defines their
relationship.”).
257 See Lowe, supra note 178, at 37, 40 (explaining that people with ideas do not want to prevent
the use of ideas but simply want to be paid for the use of that idea).
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between both parties and how they have negotiated in the past.258 If the
plaintiff brings a cause of action where the right to payment is in dispute,
but the right has been recognized and successfully executed in similar past
circumstances, the plaintiff should be justified in using contract law to
enforce the right of payment because the expectations are clear.259
Entwinement is weak because copyright law does not govern the entire
transaction; copyright law is only one piece of the transaction.260 Contract
law is therefore necessary to protect the established right of payment, a
right that is nowhere included in copyright law.261 The plaintiff and
defendant’s course of dealing implicates the plaintiff’s payment right
because the defendant’s understanding and past acceptance of the right
distinguishes the contract claim from a copyright claim.
A plaintiff who has had no prior course of dealing with the defendant
has neither established an expectation of payment nor arranged an accepted
payment procedure.262 The mutual understanding that accompanies the
formation of an implied contract is demonstrated by words and actions.263
But if a plaintiff and defendant have never transacted with one another, the
plaintiff has no basis on which to interpret the defendant’s words and
actions. Such foundational knowledge would typically help the plaintiff
decipher the defendant’s expectation to pay for the use of an idea.264 The
plaintiff cannot use contract law to protect a right that the defendant does
not know exists. As a result, it appears as if the plaintiff is merely
protecting his rights as a copyright holder. Any state law claim the plaintiff
asserts will have the identity of a copyright claim. Copyright law therefore
becomes the primary foundation of the plaintiff’s claim and preempts the
cause of action.
258 See Stephen W. Ranere, Note, Charting a Course: How Courts Should Interpret Course of
Dealing in a Battle-of-Forms Dispute, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 671, 675–77 (2008) (explaining that
“course of dealing” can help interpret ambiguous terms of a contract based on evidence of prior
dealings and that “course of dealing” can supply additional terms to the contract).
259 See Citizens Util. Co. v. Wheeler, 319 P.2d 763, 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1957) (“The price may
be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or it may be
determined by the course of dealing between the parties.”); see also GUNNAR ERICKSON, HARRIS
TULCHIN & MARK HALLORAN, THE INDEPENDENT FILM PRODUCER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 59 (2d ed.
2005) (“What makes contracts potent is that our legal system is designed to support contracts by
providing a mechanism—lawsuits—to enforce them if one side does not fulfill its promise.”).
260 See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
261 See Vanderpool, 690 P.2d at 392 (noting that where a breach is found, the fulfillment of the
expectation interest gives the injured party the benefit of the bargain and puts him in the position he
would have been in if there had been no breach).
262 See Citizens Util. Co., 319 P.2d at 769 (finding the court cannot set a price when there was no
established market price, prior course of dealings, or industry practice); see also Baumgold Bros., Inc.
v. Allan M. Fox Co., E., 375 F. Supp. 807, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (demonstrating that the understanding
of the parties is established by prior course of dealing).
263 See Johnson v. Nasi, 309 P.2d 380, 383 (Wash. 1957) (“An implied contract or mutual
understanding to pay for services rendered is not established in the absence of particular facts indicating
such mutual understanding . . . .”).
264 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 166 (5th ed. 2003)
(“[B]ehavioral patterns under prior contracts and under the contract are of enormous importance in
interpreting and supplementing the contract.”).
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Analyzing the past course of dealing between a plaintiff and defendant
will determine how expectations are managed between the two parties and
thus contributes to establishing the identity of a state law claim.
2. Second Factor: The Proximity to Making a Deal
As the plaintiff and defendant approach a finalized deal, the
expectations of payment become clearer.265 Where a defendant expresses
his interest in the plaintiff’s idea and encourages the plaintiff to further
expand the idea or to take action beyond merely disclosing the idea, the
defendant would be foolish to assume the plaintiff would perform those
services for free.266 The defendant’s affirmative step to actively involve the
plaintiff in development demonstrates an understanding that the plaintiff
would eventually have to be compensated.267 The plaintiff rightfully has an
expectation that the work he completed specifically for the defendant
would result in payment.268
The plaintiff and defendant would rely on contract law rather than
copyright law to protect these expectations. For the plaintiff, copyright law
will sufficiently protect a plaintiff’s work only up to the point that a
payment right becomes clear. When the plaintiff has initiated work for the
defendant beyond idea disclosure, contract law ensures that the plaintiff
will get paid for performing the work. For the defendant, contract law
protects the defendant’s right to receive the plaintiff’s work in exchange for
money. Therefore, as the payment right becomes clear, copyright law is
unwound from entwinement with the state law claim, leaving the plaintiff
free to pursue a breach of implied contract claim.
Furthermore, as the contact between the plaintiff and defendant
becomes frequent, negotiations progress, and the business relationship
develops, the likelihood of discussing payment becomes unavoidable. The
frequency, extent and nature of contact between the plaintiff and defendant
contribute to the likelihood that “the defendant knows or should know the
plaintiff expects payment,” an element of an implied-in-fact contract.269 As
the right of payment starts to become more defined between both parties,
265 See KELLY CHARLES CRABB, THE MOVIE BUSINESS 28 (2005) (explaining that if the defendant
accepts the material, there is some understanding that he will give something of value to the submitter
and the details are left to hash out at a later time).
266 See Anschell, Hodulik & Rohrer, supra note 14, at 26 (explaining that if a plaintiff can
demonstrate that the defendant went beyond attending a pitch meeting but took affirmative steps to
accept the idea or form a written agreement, the claim has a better chance of surviving preemption); see
also Miller, supra note 16, at 34 (explaining that in addition to a basic offer of “We want you to write
and produce a theme song for our current production[,]” the offer will indicate how much the company
is willing to pay).
267 See Anschell, Hodulik & Rohrer, supra note 14, at 26–27 (“The closer the parties come to
reaching an agreement on the terms of an express contract, the more likely it is that the idea submission
claims will survive a preemption challenge.”).
268 See PERILLO, supra note 264, at 840 (stating that “[a] contractual duty is discharged by
performance” and that “[a] frequent method of performance is payment”).
269 Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 1258, 1263 (Wash. 2008).
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contract law becomes a natural tool to protect the plaintiff if the right is
infringed.270 Copyright law would no longer be the proper mechanism to
protect the plaintiff’s rights over his work.271
Fischer might have turned out differently if it was analyzed using this
factor. The plaintiff developed materials (script, character description, fiveminute video for the defendant) for his animated character team, “‘Steve &
Bluey,”‘ with the influence of the defendant.272 Nickelodeon’s interest in
the plaintiff’s idea and inducement to expand the idea indicated that the
defendant wanted the plaintiff to perform a service for the defendant.273
The average person who performs a service in a business transaction would
expect payment.274 The series of correspondence between the plaintiff and
defendant slowly built up expectations of what the parties wanted from
each other. Copyright law cannot protect this expectation in a business
transaction.275
Where the plaintiff may have only submitted his idea without any
response from the defendant or received an outright refusal of the
submission, the plaintiff will probably find himself in the same situation as
the Selby plaintiff with no acknowledgement from the defendant of the
payment right.276 Without the payment right, the plaintiff’s only remaining
claim would be the defendant’s improper use of the work without
authorization.277 Copyright law would constitute the governing authority,
thereby preempting any breach of contract claim.278 Regardless, the
plaintiff would most likely fail in his state claim because it would be
difficult for the plaintiff to prove one of the elements of an implied-in-fact
contract in the entertainment industry: that the defendant accepted the

270 See ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 259, at 59 (“If there is doubt about what terms the parties
agreed to or whether they ever created a contract by simultaneously agreeing on the terms, a judge is
unlikely to enforce the deal.”).
271 See Lowe, supra note 178, at 41–42 (observing that the plaintiff is not seeking copyright
remedies but contract remedies such as “the benefit of the bargain”).
272 Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538 (D. Md. 2000).
273 See LITWAK, supra note 36, at 2 (noting that “if a party makes what appears to be an offer, and
the other party accepts it, the offerer will be bound by the contract even if he doesn’t want to make a
contract”); MILLER, supra note 16, at 34 (describing how an offer initiating a transaction is as simple as
saying, “We want you to do this for us.”).
274 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
275 Copyright law generally does not include the right to be paid. See Kenneth D. Crews, Museum
Policies and Art Images: Conflicting Objectives and Copyright Overreaching, 22 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 795, 826 (2012).
276 See CRABB, supra note 265, at 26 (noting that a producer will always clarify that “no
agreement is created by the submission alone; there must be a future negotiation and a written
agreement”); ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 259, at 59 (finding that if the most critical term of the
contract, the amount to be paid, is missing, a judge will not set the price and enforce the contract).
277 See MILLER, supra note 16, at 102 (stating that as part of the copyright holder’s right to control
his work, the owner can authorize others to “copy, distribute, and adapt their work”); CRABB, supra
note 265, at 26 (clarifying that the producer has no obligation to the submitter).
278 See MILLER, supra note 16, at 102 (explaining that a copyright protects a producer’s rights to
control and profit from their work).
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disclosure knowing the conditions.279 If the plaintiff has received a denial or
no response from the defendant, the defendant most certainly has not
accepted the disclosure.
Focusing on the timeline of the transaction and examining the
eventuality of a deal closing would guide the courts in determining how
each party’s expectations are defined. The closer that the parties are to
closing a deal, the more likely that one of the parties will be paid. The
further away they are from reaching a deal, the less likely the payment
terms will be defined.
3. Third Factor: Components of the Plaintiff’s Allegations
The plaintiff’s allegations will reveal the true nature of the plaintiff’s
contract claim and whether copyright law is entwined with the claim. Since
the court only looks at the facts presented by the plaintiffs and defendants,
the court can determine whether an exchange exists between the parties.
The pervasiveness of an exchange finds more support in contract law than
copyright law. Copyright law does not purport to regulate the
circumstances of an exchange; contract law does. A clear exchange
between two parties would distinguish a state claim from the principles of
copyright.
The court should look to whether the plaintiff’s complaint is focused
towards proving the elements of a contract such as mutual assent and
consideration (money in exchange for rights), or whether the complaint
concentrates on proving the plaintiff’s right to control his allegedly
infringed work. If the plaintiff’s complaint is overborne by facts that cater
to the latter, any breach of contract claim the plaintiff alleges will be
entwined with copyright. It would be difficult to separate a copyright claim
from a breach of contract claim where the plaintiff predominantly alleges
he can no longer use the work as he wishes. The plaintiff should, therefore,
rely on copyright law to assert his grievance because his state law claim
will be preempted. But if a plaintiff’s complaint asserts an exchange that
was supposed to take place, it may be easier to separate any copyright
issues from breach of contract issues. The plaintiff could then look to the
tenets of contract law to assert his claim. Nevertheless, whether a plaintiff
can look to state law or federal copyright law will depend on an intensive
examination of the allegations asserted in the complaint.
4. Fourth Factor: The Predominant Rights Protected in an Implied
Contract Claim
This last factor relies on other circumstances or facts of a case that
may establish dual expectations of payment. Where the plaintiff can prove
that the right of payment has assumed a distinct identity from the right to

279

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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control use of the copyrighted work, the plaintiff will have a stronger
chance of escaping preemption. No matter how the plaintiff labels the state
claim on the pleading or describes the rights he seeks to be protected, the
deciding court must focus its analysis on the actual relationship between
the rights asserted under state law and copyright.280 The plaintiff’s goal
should be to distinguish the rights asserted under state law from federal
rights under copyright law as much as possible.281
5. Balancing the Factors
This Comment proposes that the factors discussed above be examined
together in totality to conclude whether preemption is proper. For example,
if there is no history of a relationship between the plaintiff and defendant,
the plaintiff will have a greater burden to prove that the parties are close to
reaching a deal. Or if the parties are nowhere close to reaching a deal but
the circumstances demonstrate knowledge by each party that payment is to
occur at some point in the future, the balance will tip towards enforcement
of the right under state law. This is to ensure that the parties actually
recognize the right of payment. The factors will require courts to look at all
the circumstances of a particular case rather than resorting to a bright-line
rule. The more heavily the factors weigh in favor of pervasive entwinement
and an indistinguishable identity shared between state-created rights and
federal copyright, the greater the chances of preemption. Conversely, the
more distinct and recognized the state rights become, the greater chance
that the state claim survives preemption.
Although the “pervasive entwinement” test in the context of
constitutional law has been criticized for being unclear and vague,282 it can
be argued that any fact-specific analysis potentially carries the same issues.
For example, one criticism of the “extra element” test is that it lacks
guidance since there is always some difference between state law and
copyright law to take the claim out of preemption.283 A small difference can
be grounds for finding an “extra element,” allowing many state claims to
survive preemption and potentially rendering preemption useless. The
“pervasive entwinement” test attempts to address this problem by
examining the degree to which an “extra element” exists rather than if one
exists or not. This Comment uses the “pervasive entwinement” test as a
jumping off point. It attempts to offset the concerns of the “pervasive

280 See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 307 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the underlying right the plaintiff seeks to vindicate takes the claim outside of preemption).
281 The plaintiff’s goal is to “un-entwine” and to find an offsetting reason that would distinguish
the two claims.
282 See Mastrogiovanni, supra note 220, at 740 (stating that the Supreme Court does little to
clarify entwinement, which leads to the theory’s vague scope).
283 See Moore, supra note 82, at 204 (concluding that the “extra element” to avoid preemption can
be a small difference between state law and copyright).
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entwinement” test by using factors that will lend some clarity and serve as
a blueprint to the preemption analysis.
CONCLUSION
Copyright preemption of a state law claim has plagued the courts and
entertainment industry professionals for quite some time. The split among
the circuits regarding which test to apply and how to apply the test has led
to inconsistent results. Some courts have tried to adopt categorical rules,
which only frustrates the quest for guidance. Many courts have followed a
fact-heavy analysis without offering any guideposts as to how they
synthesized the facts to achieve their conclusion. A clear test focused on
the facts but with defined factors to structure the analysis is necessary. The
“pervasive entwinement” test used in constitutional law describes a
situation where two entities are so alike that they are indistinguishable. By
merging the two areas of constitutional law and copyright law,
constitutional law could facilitate development in an area of copyright that
courts have been unable to resolve. The “pervasive entwinement” test could
be customized to copyright law with the use of factors to guide the test. The
proposed factors to be utilized in analyzing breach of implied contract
claims for preemption are tailored to the entertainment industry. While it is
not for the judiciary to predict the future, it can examine the course of
dealing between the two parties, the extent of the parties’ working
relationship on the particular project, the plaintiff’s immediate allegations,
and other facts or circumstances that contribute to demonstrating that a
mutual expectation of payment exists. The proposed test will maintain an
emphasis on the facts of each particular case while providing courts with a
touchstone that they can use time and time again.

